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Abstract
Antiviral agents have been hailed to hold considerable promise for the treatment and prevention of emerging viral diseases
like H5N1 avian influenza and SARS. However, antiviral drugs are not completely harmless, and the conditions under which
individuals are willing to participate in a large-scale antiviral drug treatment program are as yet unknown. We provide
population dynamical and game theoretical analyses of large-scale prophylactic antiviral treatment programs. Throughout
we compare the antiviral control strategy that is optimal from the public health perspective with the control strategy that
would evolve if individuals make their own, rational decisions. To this end we investigate the conditions under which a
large-scale antiviral control program can prevent an epidemic, and we analyze at what point in an unfolding epidemic the
risk of infection starts to outweigh the cost of antiviral treatment. This enables investigation of how the optimal control
strategy is moulded by the efficacy of antiviral drugs, the risk of mortality by antiviral prophylaxis, and the transmissibility of
the pathogen. Our analyses show that there can be a strong incentive for an individual to take less antiviral drugs than is
optimal from the public health perspective. In particular, when public health asks for early and aggressive control to prevent
or curb an emerging pathogen, for the individual antiviral drug treatment is attractive only when the risk of infection has
become non-negligible. It is even possible that from a public health perspective a situation in which everybody takes
antiviral drugs is optimal, while the process of individual choice leads to a situation where nobody is willing to take antiviral
drugs.
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Introduction
Recent outbreaks of SARS and H5N1 influenza have
underlined the threat that viruses in the animal reservoir pose to
the human population. Fortunately, neither SARS nor H5N1
influenza have become endemic in humans. Nevertheless, these
and other events have stressed the importance of being prepared
for emerging and reemerging infectious diseases.
For most infectious diseases vaccination is the preferred control
measure. Indeed, vaccines generally have proven highly effica-
cious, providing strong and long-lasting immunity against
infection, disease, and transmission. However, in case of a
previously unknown infectious disease a vaccine may not be
readily available. For such emerging infectious diseases the control
options are limited. This is especially so for viral pathogens that
cannot be treated by effective antimicrobial drugs. For these
pathogens the control options are restricted to case isolation and
contact tracing, promotion of changes in behavior, vaccination
using vaccines with poor efficacy, and antiviral drugs. Although
the efficacy of currently available antiviral drugs is also far from
perfect and although antiviral drugs provide protection for a short
amount of time only, an advantage of antiviral drugs over vaccines
is their broad spectrum of action [1–5].
For a newly arising viral infectious disease it may be possible to
contain an outbreak at an early stage by means of a large-scale
antiviral control program if the control program is started early
and has high compliance rates, if the efficacy of antiviral drugs is
sufficiently high, and if the transmissibility of the pathogen is
sufficiently low [6–8]. Hence, it seems logical that all efforts should
be geared towards early control of an outbreak. However, whether
people will cooperate with such a containment strategy is not
known. Probably, the willingness to participate in a control
program depends on the (perceived) risk of infection and the
consequences of the subsequent disease as compared to the
(perceived) risk of taking antiviral drugs. If there are adverse effects
of taking antiviral drugs it may well be that people will only be
inclined to start taking antiviral drugs once the risk of infection
becomes non-negligible.
In this paper we employ population dynamical and game
theoretical analyses to investigate (i) under which conditions an
antiviral control program can prevent an epidemic, and (ii) when
people should consider taking antiviral drugs. With regard to the
latter question we take two perspectives. First, we focus on the
public health officer whose goal it is to minimize the total amount
of damage caused by both infection and prophylactic antiviral
treatment. In a second step we then compare the strategy that is
optimal from the point of view of the population as a whole with
the strategy that would evolve if individuals pursue their own
interest.
The dilemma that an individual faces is the following. Should
you take your chances and refuse antiviral prophylaxis? The price
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 1 February 2008 | Volume 3 | Issue 2 | e1558that you may have to pay upon infection may be high (death in its
most extreme consequence). The potential reward is that once you
have successfully recovered from infection you also reap the
benefit of long-lasting immunity. The alternative is that you take
antiviral drugs and so avoid the potentially high cost of infection.
The drawback of this option is that you may have to take antivirals
for a prolonged period of time. This has negative side-effects in the
short term [9], and may in the long run also not be harmless.
The situation is complicated by the fact that an individual’s risk
of infection does not only depend on whether or not the individual
itself decides to take antiviral drugs but also on the decision of
others. In the context of vaccination it is well known that in such a
situation there can be a trend of decreasing willingness to
participate in a control program, which will lead to strategies that
are not optimal from the population perspective [10–14]. Here we
ask whether similar phenomena occur in case of antiviral
prophylaxis. While vaccination usually provides long-lasting and
strong immunity after one or a few vaccination bouts, antiviral
prophylactic therapy relies on the continuous administration of
drugs. This implies that, in contrast with vaccination, individuals
have more opportunities to adjust their actions to the situation in
which they face themselves. Further, while the earlier studies focus
on the relative perceived risk of infection as compared to
vaccination, we consider infections and antiviral drugs that induce
a real, albeit possibly small, risk of death. Throughout, our aim is
to decipher how the optimal antiviral prophylactic control strategy
is moulded by the transmissibility of the pathogen, by the risk
associated with antiviral prophylaxis, and by the efficacy of
antiviral drugs in reducing susceptibility, infectiousness, and
mortality.
We would like to stress from the onset that we strive more for
conceptual clarification than for the most precise representation of
a specific system. In particular, all our analyses are based on the
simplifying assumptions that individuals act rationally, have
perfect information and foresight while they do not engage in
projecting the epidemic, and that the details of population
structure play a minor role. We are aware that these simplifying
assumptions cannot be neglected in the real world, and we
therefore do not believe that our model is suited to make
quantitative predictions for any specific emerging infectious
disease. Rather, our models serve a purpose by laying out, in an
idealized context, the key factors shaping the interests of
individuals and public health officers. In case of influenza
vaccination others have investigated models with added layers of
complexity with the goal to make quantitative predictions [13].
Methods
Stochastic and deterministic SIRV-type epidemic models in
which individuals are susceptible (S), infected and infectious (I1 or
I2), recovered and immune (R), or (partially) protected against
infection by antiviral prophylactic treatment (V) form the basis of
the analyses. Figure 1 shows a schematic of the model. Details are
given in Text S1. Throughout susceptible individuals enter the
population by birth. The (natural) death rate of susceptible and
recovered individuals is denoted by m, and the excess mortality
while on antiviral treatment is given by c. Hence, life expectancy is
m
21 in the absence of infection and antiviral control, and (m+c)
21
while on antiviral drugs. In the infected classes (I1 and I2) the
excess death rates resulting from infection are given by n and
n(12AVEI), where AVEI is the antiviral efficacy for infectiousness
and virulence. In the following, c and n will be referred to
succinctly as the cost of antiviral prophylaxis and infection. From
the susceptible class individuals move to the protected and infected
classes at rates s and l. The parameter l is colloquially called the
force of infection, and it depends on the prevalence of infection
(Text S1). Individuals in class V are infected at a reduced rate
l(12AVES), where AVES denotes the antiviral efficacy for
susceptibility. This implies that individuals in class V cannot be
infected at all if AVES=1, while the antiviral drug provides no
protection against infection if AVES=0. Finally, the rates of
recovery and non-compliance are given by a and r, respectively.
An overview of the model parameters and their default values is
given in Table 1. Details of the model analyses are provided in
Text S1.
Results
Prevention
When will a prophylactic antiviral control program be able to
prevent an epidemic? Several studies have addressed this question
using simulations of metapopulation models that include house-
hold structure and other population and pathogen details [6–8].
Here we focus on a basic model for a large well-mixed population.
To evaluate whether successful invasion of the pathogen is possible
we calculate the (basic) reproduction number (denoted by R0),
which gives the number of new infections caused by a single
infected individual in a population of uninfected individuals in the
early stages of an outbreak [15]. If R0.1 the pathogen can invade
a population in which it is not yet present, while it cannot if R0,1.
In the case that the pathogen-induced mortality is such that it
hardly affects the infectious period, the reproduction number is
given by
R0~
b
mza
mzczrzs 1{AVES ðÞ 1{AVEI ðÞ
mzczrzs
ð1Þ
(see Text S1 for a derivation). The first factor in equation (1) gives
the reproduction number in a population consisting of susceptible
individuals only
b
mza

, while the second factor represents the
sum of the fractions of individuals in the susceptible and protected
classes
mzczr
mzczrzs
and
s
mzczrzs

, where the individuals
in the protected class are weighed by their relative susceptibility
(12AVES) and relative infectiousness if infected (12AVEI). Notice
that the reproduction number increases with increasing pathogen
transmissibility (b) and length of the infectious period ((m+a)
21),
and with increasing rate at which individuals leave the protected
Figure 1. Schematic of the model. See text for details.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001558.g001
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rate of antiviral prophylaxis (s).
Equation (1) shows that the pathogen cannot invade the
population if the rate of antiviral prophylaxis exceeds a certain
critical rate of antiviral prophylactic therapy sc, which is given by
the solution of the equation R0=1. For the default parameter
values (Table 1) it turns out that the critical rate of antiviral
prophylaxis is sc=1.96 (yr
21) if antiviral drugs provide complete
protection against infection (AVES=1). This implies that approx-
imately two-thirds of the population needs to be protected against
infection by antiviral prophylaxis in order to prevent an epidemic.
This fraction increases if antiviral drugs provide partial protection
against infection and subsequent transmission.
Early control
Is it possible to prevent a major epidemic with an antiviral
response that is started quickly after an introduction of the
pathogen? To answer this question we performed stochastic
simulations in which an antiviral response is initiated after a
certain number of individuals are infected (see Text S1 for details).
Figure 2 shows three representative simulation runs of an epidemic
in a large but finite population (10
6 individuals). If no control
measures are put into place (top panel), epidemiological theory
informs that a large epidemic will unfold with probability
1{R{1
0 &0:67, and the fraction of individuals that is infected
once the epidemic has taken off is roughly given by the solution of
the final size equation (log(12x)=2R0x) [15]. For the default
parameter values this means that 94% of the population will be
infected, of which some 2% will die from the sequelae of infection.
In a population of one million individuals this implies that more
than 18,000 individuals will die during the course of an epidemic.
The situation is completely different if a large-scale antiviral
prophylactic control program is initiated once a certain number of
individuals is infected. The middle and bottom panels of Figure 2
show simulations in case of a perfect and imperfect antiviral drug,
respectively. In both panels we assume that antiviral control is
started once 100 individuals are infected, and that no individuals
are exempted from antiviral drug treatment. The middle panel
shows that even though the cost of antiviral prophylaxis is much
smaller than the cost of infection (Table 1) the number of
individuals that has died by antiviral treatment at the end of the
epidemic equals the number that has died from infection (8
individuals). If the antiviral drug is imperfect (bottom panel), the
duration of the epidemic is considerably longer, and many more
individuals will have died from antiviral treatment than from
infection (22 versus 6). Still, the total number of deaths is orders of
magnitude smaller than in the case that no antiviral control
program is effective.
The simulations of Figure 2 illustrate two general phenomena.
First, the number of infections and deaths is reduced dramatically
by an antiviral control program that is able to successfully contain
an epidemic [6–8]. Second, while the number of deaths caused by
infection is proportional to the number of infected individuals
(which is relatively small at an early stage of an epidemic), the
number of deaths related to antiviral prophylaxis is proportional to
the number of individuals that have taken antiviral drugs. The
latter may be quite large, and is probably on the order of total
population size. Hence, even though the individual risk of antiviral
prophylaxis is small and large-scale antiviral prophylactic control
appears to be the rational strategy, it may well be that the number
of deaths induced by antiviral treatment exceeds the number of
deaths induced by infection. Motivated by these observations we
investigate in the following (i) the conditions under which a large-
scale antiviral control program is able to halt an epidemic, and (ii)
the conditions under which rational individuals are willing to take
antiviral drugs.
The critical force of infection
At what point in an unfolding epidemic does the risk of infection
exceed the risk of antiviral treatment? This question is relevant
because it determines the incentive for individuals to take antiviral
drugs. We focus on the probability that an individual is alive after
a certain time (the horizon) given that it is initially susceptible or
(partially) protected against infection by antiviral control. If the
probability to remain alive is larger when initially susceptible than
when under antiviral treatment, the best option is not to take
antiviral drugs. Otherwise the reverse is true. The formal analyses
are given in Text S1. Here we summarize the main findings.
Table 1. Model parameters and default parameter values.
Parameter Default value Description
m 0.0125 (yr
21) natural death rate
b 150 (yr
21) infection rate parameter
a 50 (yr
21) recovery rate
n 1 (yr
21) infection induced mortality rate
c 0.0001 (yr
21) antiviral prophylaxis induced mortality rate
s variable rate of enrollment on antiviral prophylactic drugs
r 1 (yr
21) rate of non-compliance
AVES 1 or 0.3 antiviral efficacy for susceptibility
AVEI 0.8 antiviral efficacy for virulence and infectiousness
R0 2.94 basic reproduction number (s=0)
n
mznza
<0.02 probability of death by infection without antiviral treatment
n 1{AVEI ðÞ
mzn 1{AVEI ðÞ za
<0.004 probability of death by infection while on antiviral treatment
e
2m
(12e
2c
) <0.0001 per year probability of antiviral treatment induced death
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001558.t001
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force of infection which determines whether individuals should or
should not take antiviral drugs. The critical force of infection
strongly depends on the cost of antiviral treatment. In fact, if the
risk of antiviral treatment is low (c=0.00001 (yr
21)), the critical
force of infection ranges from 0.0005 (yr
21) to 0.0007 (yr
21) if the
horizon is one month or longer. Assuming a standard relation
between the the force of infection and the prevalence of infection
(see Text S1) this implies that individuals should consider taking
antiviral drugs once the prevalence of infection is in the range
3.4*10
26 to 4.1*10
26. Hence, taking antiviral drugs is the rational
strategy once three to four persons are infected in a population of
Figure 2. Simulations of an epidemic in a population of 10
6 individuals. The top panel shows the number of infected individuals (line) and
mortality (bars) in the absence of an antiviral control program. The middle and bottom panel show simulations in case of a control program with an
antiviral drug that provides complete (AVES=1) and imperfect (AVES=0.3, AVEI=0.8) protection, respectively. Black bars refer to deaths caused by
type 1 infection, grey bars to deaths caused by type 2 infections, and light bars to deaths caused by antiviral prophylaxis. The grey line in the bottom
panel shows the number of infected individuals who were taking antiviral prophylaxis.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001558.g002
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of magnitude the critical force of infection is also increased by
approximately one order of magnitude, and the risk of infection
outweighs the risk of antiviral prophylaxis if approximately 40 or
more individuals are infected. If the cost of antiviral treatment
increases another order of magnitude (c=0.001 (yr
21)) the critical
force of infection again increases by an order of magnitude, and
taking antiviral drugs is the rational strategy if 400 or more
individuals are infected.
Figure 4 shows two representative simulation runs of the
pathogen dynamics if all individuals base their decision whether or
not to take antiviral drugs on the critical force of infection. If the
force of infection remains smaller than the critical force of
infection (i.e. if the number of infected individuals remains below a
certain threshold) then there is no incentive to take antiviral drugs,
while the reverse is true if the force of infection exceeds the critical
force of infection. For the default parameter values the threshold is
reached when 45 individuals are infected in a population of a
million. The top panel shows that an unfolding epidemic in
principle can be halted with little cost of human lives, while the
bottom panel illustrates that high compliance rates are essential for
successful early control, preventing a rapid buildup of susceptible
individuals after the number of infected individuals has dropped
below the threshold.
Late control
Now let us suppose that attempts to control an outbreak at an
early stage have been unsuccessful. In this case it is still of interest
to determine whether and under which conditions antiviral
prophylaxis should be part of a strategy aimed at pathogen
eradication or containment. If antiviral treatment provides
complete protection against infection (AVES=1) the equilibrium
prevalence of infection decreases monotonically with increasing
rate of antiviral control, up to the point where the pathogen
cannot persist (Text S1). Furthermore, as long as the risk of
antiviral prophylaxis remains small its precise value hardly affects
the prevalence of infection. This is due to the fact that mortality
related to antiviral treatment is negligible in comparison with
natural mortality.
Although the risk of antiviral prophylaxis may have a negligible
effect on the prevalence of infection, it does affect excess mortality
at equilibrium induced by infection and antiviral treatment. In
fact, in case of a perfect antiviral drug excess mortality decreases
with increasing rate of antiviral prophylaxis if
cv
m
mza
n, ð2Þ
i.e. if the cost of antiviral prophylaxis is small compared to the cost
of infection. This implies that at equilibrium excess mortality is
lowest at the point where the pathogen is just driven to extinction.
If, on the other hand, inequality (2) is reversed, excess mortality
increases with increasing rate of antiviral prophylaxis, so that
excess mortality is lowest if no antiviral drugs are taken at all. For
the default parameter values the right-hand side of inequality (2)
equals 0.00025 (yr
21), while the cost of antiviral prophylaxis is
c=0.0001 (yr
21). Hence, in our default scenario excess mortality
decreases with increasing rate of antiviral control up to the point
where the pathogen is just unable to persist (s=1.96 (yr
21)).
The individual versus population perspective
Next we turn our attention to the different perspectives of the
individual versus the public health officer. Our focus is on the
antiviral treatment rate that minimizes excess mortality. Minimiz-
Figure 3. The critical force of infection at which the risk of
infection equals the risk of antiviral prophylaxis as a function
of the horizon. The antiviral death rate is varied from c=0.00001
(yr
21)t oc=0.001 (yr
21). The dotted lines show the approximation
based on equation (A7) of the Supporting Information.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001558.g003
Figure 4. Simulations of an epidemic in a population of 10
6
individuals when the decision whether or not to take antiviral
drugs is determined by the critical force of infection (Figure 3).
The top and bottom panel show representative simulation runs in case
of low (r=1 (yr
21)) and high (r=6 (yr
21)) rates of non-compliance,
respectively. Other parameters are as in Table 1.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001558.g004
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the strategy that is optimal from the population perspective.
Throughout this section and the next we assume that the pathogen
is endemically present at the population dynamical equilibrium. As
we have argued above, the optimal population strategy is such that
the pathogen is just unable to persist if the risk of antiviral
prophylaxis is small (i.e. if (2) is satisfied). Otherwise, the optimal
population strategy is not to take antiviral drugs at all (Text S1)
In Text S1 we also show how excess mortality of a small group
of individuals with antiviral treatment rate sy is calculated in a
population where the majority of individuals take antiviral drugs at
a rate sx. This allows one to determine the antiviral treatment
strategy that will evolve at the population level by the process of
individual choice. The optimal population and individual rates of
antiviral treatment at the population level will be denoted by s 
pop
and s 
ind, respectively.
Figure 5 shows the results of a systematic investigation of the
relation between the model parameters and the fractions of
individuals taking antiviral drugs (which are determined by the
antiviral control rates s 
pop or s 
ind). The top panel shows the
fraction of individuals taking antiviral drugs (black lines) and the
associated excess mortality (grey lines) as a function of pathogen
transmissibility. If transmissibility is low (b,51 (yr
21)) the
pathogen cannot persist, and there is no need to take antiviral
drugs. If transmissibility is intermediate there is a positive
population optimum (s 
popw0) which ensures eradication of the
pathogen, while the individual optimum is still zero (s 
ind~0). If
transmissibility is high both the population and individual control
rates are positive, although eradication is only achieved by the
optimal population control rate.
The bottom panel of Figure 5 illustrates how the fractions of
individuals taking antiviral drugs depend on the antiviral death
rate. Not surprisingly, if antiviral drugs incur no cost (c=0) then
both the population and individual optimal control rates are such
that the pathogen is driven to extinction. For the default
parameter values this is achieved if at least two-third of the
population is on antiviral drug treatment (s$1.96). If there is a
cost to antiviral treatment, then the best option is to drive the
pathogen to extinction if one takes the population perspective,
until the risk of antiviral prophylaxis exceeds the risk of infection at
the endemic equilibrium with no antiviral control (c.0.00025
(yr
21)). Alternatively, if all individuals are allowed to flexibly adjust
their own strategy, the optimal rate of antiviral prophylaxis
decreases gradually with increasing antiviral death rate. In this
case the optimal rate of antiviral prophylaxis is zero if c.0.00016
(yr
21). Notice that for intermediate cost of antiviral treatment the
public health officer favours a strategy that is aimed at eradicating
the disease, while the process of individual choice leads to a
situation where nobody is willing to take antiviral drugs.
Imperfect antiviral drugs
Unfortunately, to date there are no antiviral drugs that provide
complete protection against infection and disease. For instance, an
analysis of two recent trials with the antiviral drug oseltamivir
shows that it provides little protection against infection with
influenza, and moderate protection against subsequent shedding
and disease [16]. Therefore, we will in this section study the
consequences of antiviral prophylactic treatment with an imperfect
antiviral drug. In the analyses below we take AVES=0.3 and
AVEI=0.8 as default parameter values [16].
The relation between the antiviral efficacies for susceptibility
and infectiousness, and the optimal rates of antiviral control is
investigated in Figure 6. The top panel shows the relation between
the antiviral efficacy for susceptibility and the optimal fraction of
individuals taking antiviral drugs, assuming that antiviral efficacy
for infectiousness and virulence is fixed at AVEI=0.8. The fact that
the optimal fractions taking antiviral drugs decrease with
increasing antiviral efficacy for susceptibility can be understood
as follows. A decrease in the antiviral efficacy for susceptibility
renders the antiviral drug less effective. However, since the cost of
antiviral treatment is low while the antiviral efficacy for
infectiousness is relatively high the rational strategy is to eradicate
the pathogen if one takes the population perspective. With
decreasing antiviral efficacy for susceptibility this is achieved by
increasing the rate of antiviral control. Interestingly, the top panel
indicates that if one takes the individual perspective excess
mortality is highest if antiviral drugs provide complete protection
against infection, since then the optimal control rate is lowest.
The bottom panel of Figure 6 shows the relation between the
optimal fractions of individuals taking antiviral drugs as a function
of the antiviral efficacy for infectiousness. The antiviral efficacy for
susceptibility is fixed at AVES=0.3. The picture in this panel is
more complicated than in the top panel. In particular, eradication
of the pathogen is not feasible if the antiviral efficacy for
infectiousness drops below a critical value (AVEI,0.51). If the
antiviral efficacy for infectiousness is just above this critical value it
still is the best strategy to drive the pathogen to extinction if one
Figure 5. The optimal amount of antiviral prophylaxis at
equilibrium as a function of the basic reproduction number
(top panel) and the antiviral death rate (bottom panel) in case
of a perfect antiviral drug (AVES=1). The top panel shows the
optimal antiviral control rate from the population and individual
perspective (s 
pop: black dashed line; s 
ind: black solid line). The grey lines
give the associated excess mortality. The bottom panel shows the same
quantities as a function of the antiviral death rate (c).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001558.g005
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achieved if almost all individuals are in the protected class
(s 
pop??). If, on the other hand, the antiviral efficacy for
infectiousness is low (AVEI,0.07) it is better not to take antiviral
drugs at all (s 
pop~0) as the benefit of taking antiviral drugs do not
outweigh the cost. In this region of parameter space both optimal
control rates are zero. In the intermediate parameter regime
(0.07,AVEI,0.51) it is not possible to achieve eradication, but it
may nevertheless be wise to take antiviral drugs. In fact, taking the
population perspective, it is always better to be (partially) protected
by antiviral drugs than to be fully susceptible in this region of
parameter space (i.e. s 
pop??), even though eradication is not
possible.
Discussion
Intuitively, it may seem that one should consider antiviral
treatment when faced with a highly transmissible pathogen that
can kill its host. However, this line of reasoning may be inaccurate.
In particular, the notion that antiviral treatment is attractive
because the drugs are relatively harmless and because a potentially
large number of infection-induced deaths can be prevented is not
necessarily true. Our analyses show that over the course of an
epidemic the death toll can be considerable if no antiviral drugs
are taken, and that the number of deaths is orders of magnitudes
smaller if a large-scale antiviral control program is effective
(Figure 2). However, the analyses also show that in an epidemic
that is effectively controlled by a large-scale antiviral treatment
program the majority of deaths result from the use of antiviral
drugs. The intuitive explanation is that although the hazard of
mortality by antiviral prophylaxis is small on the short-term
individual level, the total death toll may be quite high as the
number of individuals that must receive antiviral drugs for an
effective control effort is probably on the order of total population
size. Moreover, adding to this is the fact that in the face of an
imminent threat it may prove necessary to continue taking
antiviral drugs for a prolonged period.
In the early stages of an unfolding epidemic the probability of
infection is still small. Consequently, individuals may be tempted
to put off antiviral drug treatment until the prevalence of infection
and hence the probability of infection has become non-negligible.
Our analyses have shown that the critical force of infection that
determines at what point individuals should start taking antiviral
drugs depends strongly on the adverse effects of antiviral drug use
(Figure 3). Hence, for purposes of successful prevention or early
containment it is important that the adverse effects of antiviral
drugs remain small.
Our analyses have revealed that, taking the population
perspective, the best option is either to provide antiviral drugs
up to the point where the pathogen is unable to invade and persist,
or not to provide antiviral drugs at all (Figures 5–6), depending on
the cost of antiviral treatment and the effectiveness of antiviral
treatment. If, on the other hand, one takes the individual
perspective there is an incentive to take less antiviral drugs than
is optimal from the population perspective, and complete
prevention or eradication of the disease is rarely possible.
Interestingly, the conflict between the individual and the public
health officer appears to be most pronounced when the cost of
antiviral drug treatment or the effectiveness of antiviral drugs in
reducing the adverse effects of infection are intermediate
(Figures 5–6). In fact, if the cost of antiviral prophylaxis is
intermediate it is possible that public health favours an aggressive
containment strategy that aims at pathogen eradication, while the
process of individual choice leads to a situation in which nobody is
willing to take antiviral drugs. On the other hand, if the cost of
antiviral treatment is high or if the effectiveness of antiviral drugs
in preventing the adverse effects of infection is very low, then the
conflict may become small or disappear at all (Figures 5–6).
One aspect of our model that deserves special attention is that
we have throughout assumed that the cost of both infection and
antiviral treatment are in terms of an increased risk of death. This
is convenient because it enables a straightforward comparison of
the positive and negative consequences of infection and antiviral
prophylaxis. However, although there is no question that human
infections with SARS and H5N1 avian influenza bring along a risk
of death, it is as yet unclear how severe the adverse effects of
antiviral drug treatment may be. This is especially so for rare but
possibly severe adverse effects. For instance, it is well-documented
that oseltamivir (the neuraminidase inhibitor currently used to
treat and prevent influenza infections) frequently leads to nausea
and a number of less frequent adverse effects such as hepatitis and
skin reactions [9,17]. Recently, there have been suggestions of
more serious adverse effects, including neuropsychiatric syn-
dromes that may have contributed to a number of suicide events
in Japan [18–19].
Figure 6. The optimal amount of imperfect antiviral prophy-
lactic treatment at equilibrium as a function of the antiviral
efficacy for susceptibility and infectiousness. The top panel
shows the optimal antiviral control rate from the perspective of the
individual and the public health officer (s 
ind: black solid line; s 
pop: black
dashed line) as a function of the antiviral efficacy for susceptibility. The
grey lines give the associated excess mortality. The bottom panel shows
the same quantities as a function of the antiviral efficacy for
infectiousness. Parameter values are as in Table 1 with AVEI=0.8 (top
panel) and AVES=0.3 (bottom panel).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001558.g006
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costs and benefits of antiviral drug use, previous game theoretical
studies of vaccination focused on the relative perceived risk of
vaccination as compared to infection, and thereby also introduced
a common currency to compare the costs and benefits of
vaccination [10–14,20]. Using relative perceived risk of vaccina-
tion as the basis of comparison has the advantage that it can be
easily modeled. However, this approach also has some disadvan-
tages as it assumes that the payoff loss for individuals who choose
to vaccinate is a fixed quantity (the relative perceived cost of
vaccination) which is unrelated to the actual number of adverse
events in the population, while the payoff loss for individuals who
choose not to vaccinate is proportional to the prevalence of
infection, and so does not take into account the discounting of
different costs and benefits (e.g., individuals who successfully
recover from infection reap the long-term benefit of prolonged
immunity). Ultimately, we believe that game theoretical models
such as the one we have analyzed here should be refined to include
the dynamics of human risk perception. In such models the
perceived risks of infection and antiviral treatment are not static (as
in [10–14]) but dynamically adjusted, being functions of the
different types of adverse events (different types of morbidity,
deaths) that actually occur in the population. Of course, how such
dynamical human risk perceptions can or should be modeled is not
straightforward, and would necessitate adding a fair bit of
sociology to our epidemic-game theoretical model.
Throughout this paper we have made the simplifying
assumptions that individuals and public health officer’s act
rationally, have perfect information and foresight, and that the
details of population structure and antiviral drug action play a
minor role. These assumptions were made in order to be able to
keep the analyses manageable, and to be able focus in detail on the
conflict of interest. We are, of course, aware that in the real world
a variety of complicating factors play a role. Therefore, our study
is not intended nor suited to make quantitative predictions, but it
serves to explore how the public and individual interests are
shaped by pathogen transmissibility, cost of antiviral treatment,
and antiviral efficacy for susceptibility and infectiousness.
It would be interesting to extend the model in a number of
directions in order to be able to make specific predictions for
specific viral threats. For this purpose several steps should be
taken. First, depending on the precise research question some form
of population structure would probably need to be taken into
account. For instance, if the goal were to decide how a limited
supply of antiviral drugs is best distributed across different risk
groups, the model would need to include different risk groups and
take into account that the stockpile of antiviral drugs or vaccines is
not infinitely large [21-22]. Alternatively, if the goal were to
investigate whether local containment is possible by means of a
targeted antiviral drug treatment program, it would be necessary
to include spatial structure, household structure, and possible also
workplace structure [6–8]. Overall, however, we believe that the
present state of knowledge just barely suffices to make realistic
quantitative predictions as to how effective a large-scale prophy-
lactic antiviral drug program will be, let alone that it will be
possible to make quantitative predictions when the dynamics of
human choice are taken into account. This, of course, is not
tantamount to saying that individual choice is unimportant.
Fortunately, none of the recent viral threats from the animal
reservoir (avian influenza, SARS) has succeeded in getting a
definitive foothold in the human population. As a consequence,
the key epidemiological characteristics of the next emerging virus
(transmissibility, infectious period, virulence) remain unknown.
This is also largely true for rare but serious side-effects of antiviral
drugs. This has rendered attempts to provide realistic predictions
of the effectiveness of control measures such as antiviral treatment
somewhat speculative [6–8]. Our model lacks much of the
sophistication of the earlier models, and is not suited to make
quantitative predictions. Rather, the analyses have laid out the
principles guiding the decisions of rational individuals and public
health officers when faced with an emerging viral threat for which
antiviral drugs can be deployed as a first line of defense.
Supporting Information
Text S1 Model structure and details of the model analyses
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001558.s001 (0.10 MB
PDF)
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